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Background: A linear programming (LP) model was proposed to create de-identified data sets that maximally
include spatial detail (e.g., geocodes such as ZIP or postal codes, census blocks, and locations on maps) while
complying with the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s Expert Determination method, i.e., ensuring that the risk of re-identification is
very small. The LP model determines the transition probability from an original location of a patient to a new
randomized location. However, it has a limitation for the cases of areas with a small population (e.g., median of 10
people in a ZIP code).
Methods: We extend the previous LP model to accommodate the cases of a smaller population in some locations,
while creating de-identified patient spatial data sets which ensure the risk of re-identification is very small.
Results: Our LP model was applied to a data set of 11,740 postal codes in the City of Ottawa, Canada. On this data set
we demonstrated the limitations of the previous LP model, in that it produces improbable results, and showed how
our extensions to deal with small areas allows the de-identification of the whole data set.
Conclusions: The LP model described in this study can be used to de-identify geospatial information for areas with
small populations with minimal distortion to postal codes. Our LP model can be extended to include other information,
such as age and gender.
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Privacy RuleBackground
Patients’ geographical identifiers (e.g., geocodes such as
postal/ZIP codes, street addresses and locations on
maps) are useful for health research and public health
purposes [1-4]. Geographical identifiers are also funda-
mental to the practice of spatial epidemiology [5] and
are key components of the public health professional’s
toolbox [6].
However, revealing patient data sets, including geo-
graphical identifiers, threatens patient privacy if the geo-
graphical identifiers can be linked to individuals. In fact,
some studies have revealed a threat of re-identification.
Sweeney [7] indicated that 87% of subjects could be* Correspondence: hwjung@korea.ac.kr
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article, unless otherwise stated.uniquely identified by their gender, ZIP code and date of
birth when linked with other publicly available data,
such as voting records. Moskop et al. [8] presented that
low-resolution dot maps of diseases published in several
medical journals could be used to trace most patients to
single addresses. Furthermore, Brownstein et al. [9] also
showed that a method of georeferencing and unsuper-
vised classification of the original image could be used
to precisely re-identify 26% of 550 patients by using ad-
dresses from a presentation quality map and 79% using
those from a publication quality map.
The US Health Insurance Portability and Accountabil-
ity Act of 1996 (HIPAA) allows the disclosure of per-
sonal health information for secondary purposes only if
the patients provide authorization (with some excep-
tions) [10]. If it is not practical to obtain authorization
then the data must be de-identified before disclosureentral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public
mons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this
Table 1 WCMB-LP results for the two Ottawa LP problems
In equation (3), ν ¼ sN⋅ε ¼ 1264;327 ⋅ sε Objective function value
(unit: meter)
Nearest 10 Nearest 30
s
ε ¼ 10 ε ¼ 22:4ð Þ ν = 3.783 × 10− 5 6.0 6.0
s
ε ¼ 20 ε ¼ 11:3ð Þ ν = 7.567 × 10− 5 18.9 18.7
s
ε ¼ 30 ε ¼ 7:47ð Þ ν = 11.350 × 10− 5 33.3 32.9
s
ε ¼ 33 ε ¼ 6:79ð Þ ν = 12.485 × 10− 5 37.5 37.0
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is required for the disclosure of health information with-
out consent [12,13].
According to the HIPAA Privacy Rule, de-identified
protected health information (PHI) can be created by
one of two ways [10], p.3. The first is the “safe-harbor”
method, in which all 18 identifiers, including the five-
digit ZIP codes, are removed. Yet, the first three digits of
a ZIP code may be included, provided that at least
20,000 people share the same first three digits. The sec-
ond way is “to have a qualified statistician determine,
using generally accepted statistical and scientific princi-
ples and methods, that the risk is very small” concerning
that such information could be used to identify an indi-
vidual. The “very small” risk that is used as a threshold
for disclosure control depends on the application fields
and data users, but has a range of 0.05 to 0.3 of its value
[12-15]. This study sets a threshold value of 0.2.
Studies, such as disease mapping or cluster detection
in epidemiology, require de-identified data that max-
imally include the spatial distribution of a disease while
complying with a threshold of the re-identification risk.
A prevailing method to create de-identified data sets is
to aggregate pre-defined areas, such as ZIP codes or
counties, into a new area [16]. However, this approach
loses useful spatial information while preserving privacy
[17]. Furthermore, the level of privacy protection de-
pends on the number of patient records [18]. Another
approach uses the deterministic or stochastic function of
geographical identifiers [19]. However, this heuristic
method cannot quantify the risk to individual privacy
and therefore cannot demonstrate that the risk is indeed
“very small”.
Wieland et al. [18] proposed a linear programming
(LP) model to create de-identified data sets. The LP
model determines the transition probability from an ori-
ginal location of a patient to a new randomized location
as a de-identification method. However, it cannot be
applied to data sets, including locations with small pop-
ulations (e.g., the population is smaller than the num-
ber of patients). For example, the City of Ottawa has
11,740 postal codes that have a population of more
than one. Of these, 98.61% (11,577) of postal codes
have a population smaller than the number of patients
in our data set (224 patients originated from 161 postal
codes). The median population in Ottawa postal codes
is 10 people.
To apply this LP method on real data sets, where small
areas will exist, this study revised the previous LP mode
to accommodate the case in which some postal codes
can have a smaller population than the total number of
patients. The results depicted that our revised model
can increase the applicability of the LP model in the cre-
ation of de-identified data sets.Results
Results from WCMB-LP model
This study solved two Ottawa LP problems using the
WCMB-LP model.
Table 1 shows the range of the maximum re-
identification probability and the objective function
values. In the table, optimal solutions had the s/ε range
of 10 to 33, which corresponds to the ε value range of
22.4 to 6.79 (where the number of patients, s, is 224).
That is, WCMB-LP provided impractical optimal solu-
tions for which the re-identification probability is greater
than 1.
Results from the revised model
We then solved two Ottawa LP problems formulated on
the basis of our revised LP model (Revised-LP). Table 2
shows their optimal solutions for the 224 patients. In the
nearest 10 dataset, the revised model provided an opti-
mal solution of less than 0.4 of the maximum re-
identification probability across all postal code areas.
These results were not considered acceptable for pre-
serving privacy across all postal code areas due to the
limited transition postal code areas to the nearest 10
neighbors. As described in the Introduction, this
study established a threshold value of 0.2 for the re-
identification probability.
When the transition postal code area was extended to
the nearest 30, our LP model provided an optimal solu-
tion with patient movement of 1,686.3 meter for 0.2 re-
identification probability. In this context, we considered
that the transition over the nearest 30 would provide a
smaller acceptable re-identification probability than the
nearest 10. As expected, patient movement was in-
creased for smaller re-identification probabilities, result-
ing in a greater loss of patient information. As reference,
Groubi solution time in a desktop PC (Windows 7 and
Intel Core i5 CPUs with 8G RAM) showed less than 4
seconds for Nearest 10 and 8.23 sec to 90 sec (ε =0.2)
for Nearest 30.
Discussion
Because the area population and latitude and longitude
are known for any given postal code, the LP model can
generate the optimal transition probability if the number
Table 2 Revised-LP results for the two LP problems
Re-identification
probability
Objective function value (unit: meter)
Nearest 10 Nearest 30
ε = 0.6 321.9 317.9
ε = 0.5 497.5 478.3
ε = 0.4 Infeasible* 695.4
ε =0.3 1,032.1
ε =0.2 1,686.3
*Note that “Nearest 10” is infeasible when ε ≤ 0.4.
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assumed to follow a multinomial distribution with the
transition probability. Thus, two different runs of the
same LP problem may provide different patient move-
ments with the same objective function values.
As we have observed in our empirical studies, a lim-
ited number of transition neighbors, such as 10, can ren-
der LP models infeasible or impractical in terms of
achieving an acceptable re-identification probability.
However, increasing the transition neighbors greatly in-
creases the computational burden of the LP problem to
obtain the optimal solution, considering the postal codes
in a country or region. Thus, it is essential to balance a
reasonable number of neighbors with consideration for
the LP problem size.
Conclusions
This study expanded the applicability of the previous LP
model regardless of the population across all locations
(i.e., postal code areas). Thus, our model can be ex-
tended to include other information, such as age and
gender. Future research may also include a comparison
of the performance of our LP model with that of other
methods, such as the previously described aggregation
methods.
Methods
An LP model for de-identified data sets
Wieland et al. [18] introduced an LP model to transform
a patient’s spatial identifiers to randomized identifiers in
order to create de-identified data sets. In their study, a
census block is the only spatial data to be de-identified.
Because ZIP codes (postal codesa in Canada) are a com-
mon patient residence location indicator [20,21], this
study used ZIP codes as a spatial datum to be de-
identified. In order to formulate an LP problem, the fol-
lowing notations are defined:
A Set of possible original ZIP codes as identifiers
B Set of possible randomized ZIP codes. This could be
different from set A
ni Population in ZIP code iN Sum of populations across all ZIP codes, i.e.,
∑ i ∈Ani =N
dij Distance between ZIP codes i and j
s (Total) number of patients
ε Probability that any ZIP code from the randomized
dataset originating from any specific individual in
the underlying population is at most ε
Pij (Decision variable) Transition probability from an
original ZIP code i ∈ A to a new ZIP code j ∈ B.
Using an LP solution should ensure that the risk is
“very small” while minimizing patient movement in
order to reduce substantial information loss. With the
notations defined, an LP model named WCMB-LP,
where WCMB denotes the first character of each of the
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The objective function in equation (1) minimizes the
expected total movement distance of patients, where ni/
N denotes a probability that a patient originated from
ZIP code i. The constraint in equation (2) specifies that
the patients in A should be moved to somewhere in B.
This may include self-transition, i.e., patients in a ZIP
code may remain there. Constraints in equation (3) im-
plies that “Given the set of s locations comprising the
de-identified dataset, the probability that any one of
these derived from one specific individual to be at
most ε. This is guaranteed if the probability that a loca-
tion from the randomized dataset originated from an arbi-
trary specific individual is required to be at most ε” [18],
p. 17612. Further, the transition probability Pij in equa-
tion (4) should be greater than or equal to zero. When
the decision variable Pij is obtained, patients in ZIP
code i are moved to ZIP code j using a multinomial
distributionb.
Three cases can be investigated to improve the under-
standability of equation (3) as follows:
[Case 1]: If all ZIP codes include just one person, i.e.,
ni = 1 for all i, equation (3) becomes Pij ≤ ε/s.
[Case 2]: If there is just one ZIP code, there is no
transition probability, i.e., equation (3) is reduced to
s/N ≤ ε
[Case 3]: If all patients having a randomized ZIP code
j are from i, i.e., Pkj = 0 for all k ≠ i, equation (3) becomes
s/ni ≤ ε, where ni =N. This is the same as [Case 2].
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Equation (5) is the same equation (5) in WCMB-LP
[18], p. 17612, where the first part 1/ni implies the
probability that “all individuals in ZIP code i with
population ni have an equal chance of having the dis-
ease… and the second term is a population-weighted
transition probability.”











≤ ε; for all i ∈ A and j ∈ B: ð6Þ
In equation (6), the right-hand side ε means that all
patients in B have the same randomized ZIP code, i.e.,
a randomized patient list of s patients includes one
ZIP code. Contrast to equation (5), s/ni denotes a max-
imum re-identification probability of s patients with
the same randomized ZIP code, assuming its origin-
ation from i. In this context, the number of patients
cannot exceed the number of people in ZIP code i.
That is, s/ni ≤ 1.















≤ ε; for all i ∈ A and j ∈ B:
ð7ÞFigure 1 The functional form of equation (9).Rearranging equation (7) and incorporating it into

























⋅Pij ≥ 0; for all i ∈A and j ∈B;




Note that equation (8) is the difference between
WCMB-LP and our Revised LP.
Properties of re-identification constraint
In order to investigate the re-identification constraint
further, let v =min(s/Nε, ni/Nε) in equation (8). Then,











⋅Pkj þ niN −ν
 
⋅Pij ≥ 0; for all i ∈A and j ∈B;
where the first part is non-negative because Pkj ≥ 0 for
all k and j, and the second part can be represented by
the following function g of variable ni:




































Function g in equation (9) can be represented as in
Figure 1, where g(ni) has the smallest value of (s/N)(1 −
1/ε) when population ni = s holds and then increases
across zero at ni = s/ε.
The leftmost region from 1 to s in Figure 1, i.e., ni ≤ s,
corresponds to the first equation in equation (9). In that
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decreasing because ε is assumed to be less than 1. The
middle region from s to s/ε (i.e., ni > s) corresponds to
the second equation in equation (9), where function g
(ni) is negative and is increasing. The rightmost region
(the second equation in equation (9)) denotes that the
function g(ni) for ni ≥ s/ε always has a positive value.
Thus, the corresponding constraints in equation (8) of
our Revised-LP model are always satisfied, i.e., they are
redundant because all of its corresponding constraints’
coefficients are nonnegative. A redundant constraint is
one that can be left out without changing the model.
Dataset
In this study, a data set called Ottawa, which includes
only areas with a population of more than one, as in
Wieland et al. [18], was applied to both WCMB-LP and
our Revised-LP models. Our data set was based on pa-
tients’ information in a population of 264,327 children
under the age of 18 residing in Ottawa, Canada. Our
purpose was to randomize the postal codes of a patient
list in CHEO (Children’s Hospital of Eastern Ontario)
presenting in the emergency department. The patient list
included 224 patients from 126 ZIP codes, in which the
number of patients corresponded to 5% of an estimated
4,500 people who visited CHEO in a month during the
height of the influenza season. The patients were chosen
from a pool of CHEO patient postal codes.
The area of each postal code was represented by the
centroid latitude and longitude. The distance between
two postal-code areas was computed by using the
Haversine formula [22], which provides the shortest
(also termed ‘as-the-crow-flies’ ignoring any hill or
great-circle) distance between any two points on a
spherical earth from their longitudes and latitudes. El-
lipsoidal effects are ignored, but the result is sufficiently
accurate for the purpose of the present study.
Because our data set included 11,740 postal codes, the
LP formulation had 137,827,600 variables (i.e., 11,7402)
and 137,839,340 constraints [i.e., 11,740 (1 + 11,740)]. In
order to reduce the size of this LP problem, transitions
from any postal code area were limited to the following
two cases: the nearest 10 and 30 postal code areas, i.e.,
two LP problems with 117,400 and 352,200 variables,
and 129,140 and 360,940 constraints, respectively. The
two LP problems were solved by using Gurobi 6.5.2
solver [23] with MPL 4.2n modeling language [24].
Ethics approval for this study was obtained from the
CHEO research Institute research ethics board.
Endnotes
aThis study interchangeably uses term “postal” and
“ZIP” codes. However, when we mention data from
Canada, the term postal codes are intentionally used.bAn R library [25] has a command of generating a
multinomially distributed random number in r. WCMB-
LP has |A||B| variables and |A| + |A||B| constraints.
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